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To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this
paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have
full information and learn using forecast rules speci￿ed as in the minimum state
variable representation of the economy. Applying this to the benchmark stochastic
growth model shows that the economy with learning converges quickly to an equi-
librium very similar to that with model-consistent expectations. In other words,
if households are individually rational, the assumption that they can also form
model-consistent expectations does not seem a strong one. The mechanism by
which learning a⁄ects the model is considered in detail and the implications of
relaxing the assumptions of the baseline case are explored.
JEL classi￿cation: D83; C62; E30.
Keywords: adaptive learning; rational expectations; bounded rationality; ex-
pectations formation.
1 Introduction
The macroeconomic learning literature assumes agents are unable to formmodel-consistent
("rational") expectations. The question is then how to model the formation of expec-
tations and whether a particular model of expectation formation will mean the economy
converges to the same equilibrium as an economy with model-consistent expectations or
whether learning adds new dynamics.
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1Models of learning need to make assumptions in three further areas. Firstly, how
rational are individuals conditional on their expectations of the macroeconomy (Adams
and Marcet, 2011, refer to this as internal rationality)? Some work (e.g. Evans et al, 2009,
also see the discussion in Evans et al, 2011) assumes individuals are rational regarding
their individual decisions (i.e. they are fully forward-looking and know their budget
constraints). Others (e.g. Bullard and Mitra, 2002; Carceles-Poveda, and Giannitsarou,
2007; Evans et al, 2011) adopt the "Euler equation learning" approach which assumes
that agents are boundedly rational with regard to their individual decisions only looking
forward a single period and ignoring their ￿rst-order conditions and budget constraints
beyond that.
Secondly, what information is at agents￿disposal? Some work (e.g. Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001) assumes that agents learn from aggregate consumption, some from
the states (e.g. Carceles-Poveda, and Giannitsarou, 2007) and some from other variables
(e.g. Evans et al, 2009).
Thirdly, given this information, how are learning rules speci￿ed? Some papers assume
learning rules are speci￿ed in the same way as the minimum state variable solution of the
economy with model-consistent expectations (e.g. Carceles-Poveda, and Giannitsarou,
2007, such learning rules are also the "saddlepath learning" of Ellison and Pearlman,
2011); some add an intercept to such a rule (e.g. Milani, 2011) and many others make
plausible but apparently arbitrary assumptions about which variables are in the learning
rules.
There is a wide diversity of such assumptions across the literature and it is often
di¢ cult to see the extent to which results arise from the central question of the learning
literature, the inability to form model-consistent expectations, or from assumptions in
other areas. To address this issue, this paper proposes a baseline case in which the
only assumption relaxed is that of model-consistent expectations. This case consists of
individuals who are rational conditional on their expectations; who have full information
about the macroeconomy (in the sense that they observe relevant aggregates without
noise) and who have learning rules speci￿ed in terms of the minimum state variable
(MSV) representation of the economy under model-consistent expectations.
Such a baseline case isolates the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expec-
tations and is applicable to any learning model. This paper uses it to investigate the
impact of learning in the stochastic growth model. Then the assumptions of the baseline
case are relaxed in two directions. Firstly, the degree of individual rationality is allowed
to vary by adding the household￿ s forecast horizon as a parameter. Secondly, di⁄erent
speci￿cations of the learning rule are investigated1.
The main results are as follows:
1The third assumption of full information is relaxed in a companion paper, Graham (2011).
21. The degree to which households are forward looking has a dramatic e⁄ect on the
speed of convergence. If households look forward only one period (which is similar
to "Euler equation learning" ) the model can take many tens of thousands of periods
to converge and may not converge at all. On the other hand, if households have
an in￿nite horizon, convergence is fast and robust - in the case of ordinary least




2. Constant gain learning has only very small e⁄ects on the business cycle properties
of the model. Further, under most parameterizations the e⁄ect of learning is to
mute the response of output to technology shocks.
3. If an intercept is included in the learning rules, the e⁄ect of learning is somewhat
stronger, but still small and the response of output is still muted.
The ￿rst set of results relates to the speed of convergence. This matters for two
reasons. Firstly, fast convergence gives a justi￿cation for the hypothesis of model-
consistent expectations. If convergence is fast, a model-consistent expectations equi-
librium (MCEE) can be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process that has already
converged (Grandmont, 1998) without the need for strong assumptions on households￿
cognitive ability. Secondly, studies of the implications of learning for business cycle dy-
namics typically initialize the model at the MCEE to avoid arbitrary transition dynamics
contaminating the results. If convergence is fast, this seems justi￿ed. If it is slow, this
is endowing households with exactly what they would have di¢ culty learning.
This paper shows that households￿forecast horizon is the key variable that determines
the speed of convergence under both ordinary least squares and constant gain learning.
With in￿nite horizons, convergence is fast; with short horizons, it is very slow and may
not occur at all. Some previous work (Dawid, 2005; Branch et al 2010) has examined
the impact of such horizons for macroeconomic dynamics. This paper shows a further
way in which the horizon matters.
The second set of results relates to business cycle dynamics. With the baseline set
of assumptions, the e⁄ects of learning are quite small. A natural metric is the standard
deviation of aggregate consumption, and learning increases this by at most 2% over
its value at the MCEE. While learning makes consumption more volatile, its impact
on labour supply and investment means output is less volatile than at the MCEE. This
stands in contrast to the simple intuition that by increasing the volatility of expectations,
learning increases the volatility of the macroeconomy (it turns out that this intuition can
be recovered only in the case of very short forecast horizons, which correspond to "Euler
equation learning"). Understanding these results requires a careful consideration of
the complicated mechanism by which constant gain learning a⁄ects the dynamics of this
3economy. To elucidate this mechanism, the paper considers a simple univariate example
with exogenous income and ￿xed capital and labour before turning to the model economy.
One way of interpreting results (1) and (2) is that if households are individually ratio-
nal, the assumption of model-consistent expectations is not all that important. Individual
rationality and constant gain learning is su¢ cient for the economy to converge quickly
to an equilibrium which would in practice be indistinguishable from the equilibrium with
model-consistent expectations.
This all applies to the baseline case in which learning rules are speci￿ed as in the
MSV solution. While there are many other plausible speci￿cations for learning rules
(for example, including aggregate consumption or more lags) a number of recent papers
(e.g. Milani, 2011) have added an intercept to the learning rule, often interpreted as
representing uncertainty about the steady state. This is shown to strengthen the e⁄ect
of learning on the standard deviation of consumption, the maximum e⁄ect being an
increase of around 4% in the standard deviation, but output is still less volatile than
under model-consistent expectations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3 discusses
its general properties under learning. The properties of the model under least squares
learning are discussed in section 4 and under constant gain learning in section 5. Section
6 concludes. Detailed derivations are provided in the Appendices.
2 The model
This section presents the standard stochastic growth model. Rather than starting from a
representative household, a large number S of identical households are considered. While
in equilibrium households will be identical, it is important to carefully distinguish between
aggregate and individual quantities when modelling an individual household￿ s decision.
Upper case letters represent levels; lower case letters their linearized equivalents.
2.1 Households
The problem of household s is to choose paths for consumption (Cs
t) and labour supply
(Ns




















￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply and ￿ the subjective discount
rate. The expectations operator is written as ~ Es
t since in the general case households will
have model-inconsistent ("non-rational") expectations and expectations will di⁄er across















t is wage, Rs
kt the aggregate return to capital, Is
t is investment and Ks
t capital
which evolves according to
K
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where ￿ is the depreciation rate.




























There are also a large number of identical ￿rms which use aggregate capital and labour




where At is an aggregate productivity shock. The ￿rst-order conditions are


















As is standard in the learning literature, this paper will study a linearised version of the










2More details can be found in Appendix A.
5and labour supply (5) is
n
s
t = & [wt ￿ c
s
t] (10)
where & = 1￿N
N￿ and N is steady state labour. Household capital evolves according to
k
s





and the budget constraint (2) is
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where $ is the steady state consumption - output ratio.
The ￿rst-order conditions for ￿rms are
wt = yt ￿ nt (13)
rkt = yt ￿ kt (14)
and the production function is
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + ￿(nt + at) (15)
To close the model, specify a process for exogenous technology
at = ￿at￿1 + "t (16)
where "t is drawn from N (0;￿2).
2.5 Equilibrium
De￿nition 1. (Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium for the above economy is a










￿ aggregate factor inputs fkt;ntgt=1:1
such that
1. Given prices, the allocations solve the utility maximization problem for all house-
holds.
2. frt;wtg are the marginal products of aggregate and individual capital and labour
i.e. rs
t = rt;ws
t = wt 8s.
63. All markets clear
2.6 Calibration
Values for most of the parameters are chosen following Campbell (1994): ￿ = 0:025,
￿ = 0:6, ￿ = 0:99, N = 0:2. The intertemporal elasticity of labour supply 1
￿ is chosen
to be 5. The aggregate productivity shock is given standard RBC values, ￿ = 0:9;
￿ = 0:7% per quarter. This is only a benchmark calibration. Sensitivities are given to
all important parameters.
3 Learning and optimal decisions
With model-consistent expectations, the model presented above is fully speci￿ed. With
learning, further modelling choices have to be made in three areas. Firstly, what degree
of individual rationality do we assume? Secondly, what variables are in households￿
information set? Thirdly, how are households￿learning rules speci￿ed?
The existing literature makes various choices. The "Euler equation" approach (see
Evans et al, 2011) assumes households are boundedly rational in that they use only their
Euler equation to implement consumption, forecasting their own consumption and the
return just one period ahead. This implies that consumption decisions will not satisfy
expected budget constraints (since the household does not look forward more than one
period), though the budget constraints themselves always hold. The learning rules
are written in terms of aggregate consumption3 and the states. Households have full
information on aggregate consumption (or at least they know all households are identical
so their consumption is the aggregate), the return and the states. This is generalised in
Branch et al (2010) to allow households to look forward an arbitrary number of periods.
In contrast, Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) implement a model in which
households only look one period ahead but forecast capital using a learning rule speci￿ed
as in the MSV solution (their equation 45). The process for technology is assumed to be
known. They do not make the distinction between individual and aggregate quantities
which is equivalent to assuming that households know they are identical i.e. the forecast
of aggregate capital is taken to also be a forecast of individual capital.
Eusepi and Preston (2011) take a di⁄erent approach. They assume households are
rational (having in￿nite horizons and using both budget constraints and Euler equations).
In terms of information, households observe aggregate states and prices. Learning rules
contain the same variables that appear in the minimum state variable representation of
the economy, with the addition of an intercept. They further assume that the process
3In this sense, "Euler equation learning" has agents learning about their own consumption decisions.
Forecasting choice variables seems a somewhat odd way to model bounded rationality.
7for technology is known (this is necessary for households to be able to detrend by it)
and that while the innovation to technology is observed by households for the purposes
of implementing consumption, it is not used in the learning process (see the discussion
in their section II). A further example is Evans et al (2009). Here households are
individually rational and the learning rule is speci￿ed in terms of prices not states.
These four examples illustrate some of the diversity of assumptions to be found across
the learning literature. This paper proposes a baseline case in which households:
1. Are rational conditional on their expectations of the macroeconomy
2. Have an information set consisting of all aggregates
3. Forecast using rules of the same form as the minimum state variable representation
of the economy with model-consistent expectations
Comparing such an economy with one in which households have model-consistent
expectations gives the cleanest answer to the basic question of the learning literature -
how important is the assumption of model-consistent expectations for the properties of
the macroeconomy?
3.1 Optimal consumption
Assume the household looks forward T periods when making its consumption decision
(Dawid, 2005, refers to this as the "planning" horizon). Clearly T = 1 is the standard
in￿nite horizon case. With T = 1 the structural model is identical to that of Carceles-
Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) and is closely related to the "Euler equation learning"
of Evans et al (2011)4.
To solve for consumption, substitute for labour from (10) and for capital from (11) in















where the constants are de￿ned as part of the derivation in Appendix B.


































4There are cases in which one-period forecasts can be optimal e.g. risk neutrality.
8Then the Euler equation (9) can be used to substitute for expected future consumption
in terms of the return to give
c
s

































where the constants are again de￿ned in Appendix B.
The term in square brackets is consumption out of current wealth consisting of the
households￿capital in their current factor income (the constants on the prices arise from
substituting out for quantities). The other terms represent consumption out of expected
future income. The presence of the ￿nal term is a reminder that the problem is that of
an in￿nitely lived household with a ￿nite forecast horizon.
3.2 The perceived law of motion
Following the "saddlepath learning" of Ellison and Pearlman (2011), learning rules are
assumed to be speci￿ed in terms of the variables in the MSV representation of the economy






De￿ne matrices Tk and Ta such that kt = TkXt, at = TaXt.






Since aggregate states do not appear in (19), households also need to estimate the relation









































A number of papers (e.g. Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007 and Evans et al,
2011) omit this step. This is equivalent to assuming that (a) households know the
9relations between prices, states and consumption (28) and (29) below (or can estimate
exactly such relations) and (b) households know that they are identical. In this case
there is no need to estimate processes for the prices, and (19) reduces to an expression
in the aggregate states and expectations thereof.
In the in￿nite horizon case, the ￿nal term in (19) can be dropped using the transversal-
ity condition. With ￿nite forecast horizons, households need to forecast this term, their
own future capital. This is odd, and is analogous to households with "Euler equation
learning" needing to forecast their own consumption (see footnote 3). Since households
are only identical in equilibrium, the most consistent way of addressing this would be
to have households have a separate learning rule for their own capital. But to simply
things, and to allow comparison with Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007), this pa-
per assumes that for the purposes of forecasting the ￿nal term households know that their
capital will always be equal to aggregate capital and so they can use (20) to forecast it.
Then the consumption function (19) can be written
c
s







where the expectational terms are captured in
￿
s































In the case of T = 1, this expression reduces to








and in the case of T = 1












3.3 The actual law of motion
The derivations that follow are from the modeler￿ s perspective. No agent in the economy
has su¢ cient knowledge to carry them out (which is another way of saying that they are
unable to form model-consistent expectations).
In equilibrium, all households are identical i.e. for any variable x; xs
t = xt 8s. If
markets clear, prices are:
wt = ￿wkkt + ￿waat + ￿wcct (28)
rt = ￿rkkt + ￿raat + ￿rcct (29)
10and labour is
nt = ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)kt + ￿at ￿ ct) (30)
Expressions for the coe¢ cients are given in Appendix A.3. Note that in the case of ￿xed
labour supply (￿ ! 1) prices are independent of aggregate consumption, ￿wc = ￿rc = 0.
Given households are identical, (24) is also an expression for aggregate consumption
and substituting for current prices in terms of states from (28) and (29) gives
ct =
￿ck
1 ￿ ￿ck (￿3￿wc + ￿5￿rc)
 "






where ￿cX is de￿ned in (25).
Substituting this in the aggregate capital evolution equation allows the economy to
be written in the form













3.4 The model-consistent expectations equilibrium
The model-consistent equilibrium is a ￿xed point of
￿ = T(￿) (34)
As in the standard case, there is no closed-form expression for the MCEE so it has to
be calculated numerically5. As would be expected, the model-consistent equilibrium is


















A general updating rule for ￿ can be written
5In practice, this is done by using a numerical equation solver (Matlab￿ s fsolve function) to ￿nd a
zero of T(￿) ￿ ￿.


















where ￿t is the gain. This paper will consider two cases, ordinary least squares learning
(￿t = 1
t) and constant gain learning (￿t = ￿). An updating rule of the same form is
speci￿ed for ’. Stacking the rules as in (33) gives an updating rule for ￿.
3.6 E-stability and learnability
Will the model-consistent expectations equilibria found in section 3.4 be e-stable and
learnable? A standard result (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) is that the stability of a
system consisting of a PLM, (20), and ALM, (32) and a learning rule (37) and (38) is
related to the stability of an associated ordinary di⁄erential equation (ODE)
d￿
d￿
= h(￿), where h(￿) = lim
t!1E (T(￿) ￿ ￿) (39)
The economy with ordinary least squares learning (￿t = 1
t ) will converge to ￿ only if ￿
is a locally stable ￿xed point of the associated ODE i.e. the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
of h(￿) have negative real parts. An analytical expression is only available for these
eigenvalues in the case of T = 1 (see Appendix C.2); in other cases they must be obtained
numerically.
Under constant gain learning (￿t = ￿ > 0), things are more complex but Evans and
Honkapohja (2001, p162) show that if the gain is su¢ ciently close to zero the PLM will
converge to a limiting normal distribution around the MCEE.
3.7 Projection
In the baseline case with an in￿nite horizon, the consumption function (31) is only de-
￿ned when (I ￿ ￿￿) is invertible, see (26). Since the term comes from computing the
discounted sum of the expected future path of prices, the invertibility condition is the
same as requiring the sum to be bounded. This is summarised in the following de￿nition
De￿nition 2. (stable PLM): A given ￿
s is stable if it results in consumption being
bounded. This will be the case if the eigenvalues of ￿
s
t are less than ￿
￿1 > 1 in ab-
solute value.
Theorem 4 of Ljung (1977, p. 557), which forms the basis of many convergence
results in the learning literature employs a "projection facility" constraining estimates to
remain in a region around the MCEE. This has been widely criticized (e.g. Grandmont
12and Laroque, 1991 and Grandmont, 1998) since it involves endowing households with
knowledge of what they are supposed to be learning. Even though a projection facility
has been shown not to be necessary to proofs of convergence and stability in models
with a unique MCEE (Bray and Savin, 1986) or more generally (Evans and Honkapohja,
1998), it is crucial for any numerical implementation of learning. To see this note that
with a non-zero gain there is always a ￿nite probability that particular sequence of shocks
will lead to a household estimating a PLM that is unstable in the sense of de￿nition 2,
leading forecasts to grow without limit and consumption to be unde￿ned.
The form of the consumption function (31) gives a natural way to de￿ne a projection
algorithm which escapes the critiques of Grandmont and Laroque.
De￿nition 3. (projection facility): After estimating the PLM households check the eigen-
values of ￿
s




If the projection facility is used there are many ways to pick a ￿
s
t which are do not
involve endowing households with knowledge of the RPE. The simplest way is to use the
value from the previous period6.
In the remainder of the paper, q is taken to be unity which can be interpreted as
endowing households with the knowledge that the macroeconomy is stationary. There
are two justi￿cations for this. Firstly, estimating a VAR of the form (20) is problematic
with non-stationary variables. Secondly, the consumption function is strongly non-linear
for PLMs with eigenvalues greater than unity (recall that as eig (￿
s) ! ￿
￿1;cs ! +1)
and allowing beliefs to enter this range means arbitrary amounts of volatility can be
generated in the macroeconomy (see the discussion in section 5.6).
Projection is rarely discussed in the context of numerical analysis. Williams (2003)
and Eusepi and Preston (2011) both mention in footnotes that they discard explosive
values though it is not clear if this includes rational bubble paths, though in the latter
paper at least the very small gains used means that such paths will be rare events.
With "Euler equation learning" (Evans et al, 2011), there is no in￿nite forward sum
in the consumption function so the issue does not arise although Carceles-Poveda and
Giannitsarou (2007, p2673) explicitly exclude non-stationary paths.
4 Ordinary least squares learning
The results on e-stability and learnability discussed in section 3.6 are local and asymp-
totic. To investigate the convergence properties of the model it is necessary to turn to
6From a Bayesian perspective, projection is equivalent to having a truncated prior. When a draw
triggers the projection facility, the response of a Bayesian would be to move the posterior in the direction
of the non-stationary solution rather than simply ignoring the information. In practice, the method of
choosing the ￿projected￿value makes no di⁄erence to the properties of the model.
13simulations. This section takes the case of OLS learning (something of a benchmark in
the learning literature); the next section deals with constant gain learning.
4.1 The speed of convergence
Figure 1 shows the convergence of the model in the two extreme cases of households who
only look forward one period (T = 1) and those with an in￿nite horizon (T = 1). A
uninformative prior is chosen setting all the elements of ￿0 and ’0 to zero. The model
is then simulated many times and the ￿gures show the the mean path of each element of
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (the di⁄erence to the value at the MCEE) along with the range in which 99% of
paths lie.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Comparing the two panels of the ￿gure is striking - if households have in￿nite horizons
(T = 1), the model converges very quickly, within a 100 periods or the elements of ￿
are very close to their value at the MCEE. In contrast, if households only look forward
one period (T = 1) the economy has not converged within the thousand periods shown
on the diagram and in fact doesn￿ t converge at all.
To understand this result, take a simple example in which households have learnt a
PLM which implies no persistence for the aggregate states i.e. ￿ = 02x2. In this case,
given the baseline calibration, with T = 1 the consumption function (31) is approximately
ct ￿ 0:5(kt + ￿2at) (40)
and with T = 1
ct ￿ 0:01(kt + ￿2at) (41)
This is a direct consequence of the limited forecast horizon - in the ￿rst instance house-
holds spread their total wealth (the term in parenthesis, which since households believe
there is no persistence consists simply their holdings of capital and the output arising
from current technology) over two periods; in the second instance they spread it over
their in￿nite horizon.
The resulting ALMs are with T = 1
kt+1 = 0:53kt + 0:04at (42)
and with T = 1
kt+1 = 1:01kt + 0:07at (43)
14Recall from (35) that under model-consistent expectations, the law of motion of capital
is
kt+1 = 0:96kt + 0:06at (44)
Comparison of these shows that with T = 1 the ALM is very close to the MCEE even
with a PLM so far from the MCEE7.
In the next period, the PLM is updated so will move further towards the MCEE in
the case of T = 1 than in the case of T = 1 and hence convergence is faster. With
OLS learning the gain falls as time passes and with T = 1 the economy gets stuck away
from the MCEE (see section 5.1 below for a similar case with constant gain learning). In
fact, with T = 1 convergence only occurs if the economy is initialized very close to the
MCEE.
To summarise, the speed of convergence is increasing in the forecast horizon because
given a PLM the higher the forecast horizon, the more the resulting ALM resembles the
MCEE so the faster the PLM is updated towards the MCEE.
Plotting the elements of ￿ provides a useful illustration of the speed of convergence
but doesn￿ t say much about how the economy along the convergence path compares with
that at the MCEE since in general, di⁄erent elements of ￿ will have di⁄erent impacts
on the equilibrium (and households are also learning ’). Figure 2 instead plots impulse
response functions along the convergence path. These are computed by using the same
data as for ￿gure 1 then for each draw running an impulse response function assuming
the law of motion in the economy is ￿xed at its value at a particular point along the
convergence path.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
They tell the same story - convergence in terms of the behaviour of the economy is
much quicker for the in￿nite horizon case - but also show another interesting feature.
The con￿dence intervals for the T = 1 case are much wider than with T = 1. This is
because the consumption in the in￿nite horizon case is much more sensitive to ￿ than in
the case of T = 1, a simple consequence of the in￿nite sum in the consumption function.
So a given volatility of ￿ results in a higher volatility of consumption with T = 1 than




Theorem 3 of Benveniste et al (1990, p110)8 studies a system of the form of (20) and (32)
under OLS learning (￿t = 1
t). It states that if the derivative of h(￿) de￿ned in (39) has
7The ALM for capital with T = 1 is actually explosive but recall that this is not a steady state but
instead just a point along the convergence path.
8Also used by Marcet and Sargent (1995) and Ferrero (2007).




D ! N (0;P) (45)
where the matrix P satis￿es the Lyapunov equation
[I=2 + h￿ (￿





0 = 0 (46)
As pointed out by Marcet and Sargent (1995), this means that if the conditions are satis-
￿ed, there is root - t convergence, although the formula for the variance of the estimators
is modi￿ed from the classical case. As the eigenvalues become larger, convergence is
slower in the sense that the variance covariance matrix of the limiting distribution P is
larger.
An analytical expression is available for the eigenvalues only in the case of T = 1 (see
Appendix C.2) so in the general case they are calculated numerically. The Jacobian will
have two eigenvalues equal to ￿1. For T = 1 the other two are ￿0:074 and ￿0:042; for
T = 1, ￿2:56 and ￿1:54, so the theorem holds for the latter case and not the former.
Figure 3 plots the largest eigenvalue for a range of forecast horizons. Under the baseline
calibration the theorem holds for T > 12.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Eigenvalues were then calculated for around 15,000 calibrations over a wide grid9.
With T = 1, the largest eigenvalue increases with ￿, ￿;￿ and decreases with ￿, ￿.
The only cases where the theorem is not satis￿ed are with very persistent of aggregate
technology, ￿ = 0:99. On the other hand, with T = 1 there were no cases which satisfy
the theorem.
There are a number of ways convergence could be further studied. One would be to
calculate the variance-covariance matrix P of the limiting distribution in (45). Another
would be to follow Marcet and Sargent (1995) who propose a statistic that allows the
speed of convergence to be studied (Ferrero, 2007 is a more recent application). They
de￿ne the rate of convergence ￿ as
t
￿ k￿t ￿ ￿
￿k
D ! F (47)
for some non-degenerate and well-de￿ned distribution F. This has the desirable property
that it captures convergence in a single statistic.
9The ranges were chosen to encompass values commonly used in the literature. The grid is
not particularly ￿ne, but experimentation showed no evidence of any non-linear e⁄ects. ￿ 2
[0:001;0:01;0:025;0:10;0:50];￿ 2 [0:4;0:5;0:6;0:7;0:8];; ￿ 2 [0:96;0:97;0:98;0:99;0:999]; ￿ 2
[0;1;5;10;1]; ￿ 2 [0:7;0:9;0:95 ;0:97;0:99]; ￿ 2 [0:01;0:5;0:7;1;10]. The bold ￿gure represents the
baseline calibration.
16A drawback is that in general di⁄erent elements of the PLM will have di⁄erent e⁄ects
on the dynamics of the economy, the statistic may not give much useful information about
how close the behaviour of the economy along the convergence path is to that at the
MCEE. An alternative approach would look at the convergence of the impulse response
functions Figure 3 shows how the response of the economy to a positive technology
shock changes along the convergence path, the dotted line is the response at the REE,
the solid line is the mean response and 99% of responses lie within the shaded area. A
similar statistic to (47) could be de￿ned in terms of the impulse-response function, and
this would give a more economically meaningful measure of convergence.
Carrying out such exercises for the model of this paper gives little interesting informa-
tion. The impact of di⁄erent calibrations on the rate of convergence is modest and the
results of the kind reported in ￿gures 1 and 2 are robust to all the calibrations studied.
The forecast horizon is the dominant determinant of the speed of convergence.
5 Constant gain learning
Constant gain learning is often used to study business cycle dynamics since it captures
the idea that learning is perpetual and allows households to respond to changes in the
structure of the economy. The gain parameter can be chosen in various ways. Milani
(2007, 2011) estimate it along with the other parameters of the model. Eusepi and
Preston (2011) use survey data. Evans and Ramey (2006) allow households to choose
it optimally. This paper will study gain parameters in the range [0:001 0:05] which
encompasses all the values commonly used. A baseline value of 0:01 is chosen.
A simple way to interpret the gain is by noting that the weight on the forecast error
from ￿ periods ago relative to the weight from the most recent forecast error is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)
s. So a gain of 0:02 (as estimated in Milani, 2007) implies data from around 34
quarters ago is given approximately half the weight of current data. On the other hand,
a gain of 0:002 (the baseline value of Eusepi and Preston, 2011) means households put
half as much weight on data from 84 years ago as they do on current data.
5.1 The speed of convergence
Figure 4 shows how ￿kk, the autoregressive term on capital in the PLM, converges for
di⁄erent values of the gain10. Panel A shows the case of T = 1, panel B the case of
T = 1. Again the ￿gures in panel A are drawn 1,000 periods, whereas those in panel B
are over 100 periods.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
10Other elements of ￿ are not shown to save space, but tell a similar story.
17These ￿gures reinforce the message of the previous section. With T = 1 convergence
is fast for all values of the gain. With T = 1, convergence is much slower.
5.2 The distribution of beliefs
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Theorem 7.8, p165) show that under certain conditions
beliefs converge to a limiting normal distribution with mean at the MCEE and standard
deviation increasing in the gain. In practice, the conditions for the theorem may not be
satis￿ed and the distributions of beliefs needs to be investigated numerically.
Beliefs in the model economy are characterized by 8 variables de￿ned by (20) and
(21). Figure 5 shows the distribution of the elements of ￿ (similar graphs can be drawn
for the elements of ’ but they do not add much to the intuition given here). It is
important to remember that the variables are not independent and in fact the stationary
distribution is an 8-diminesional object. For low gains, the mean of the distribution is the
same as the value of the PLM at the MCEE, and the distribution is symmetric. As the
gain increases, there are three e⁄ects. Firstly, the standard deviation of the distribution
increases; secondly, the mean of the distribution falls and thirdly the distribution becomes
more skewed.
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
The ￿rst of these is a direct result of the increasing gain and as expected from the
theorem of Evans and Honkapohja (2003). Higher gains mean more weight in the learning
rule on forecast errors, so the PLM becomes more volatile. The second and third are a
consequence of the interaction between increasing gain and projection. The higher the
gain, the higher the standard deviation of beliefs so the more likely they will be unstable
(in the sense of De￿nition 2) and so be eliminated by the projection algorithm11. This
truncates the distribution to the right, so reducing the mean and making the distribution
more skewed to the left12.
Table 1 shows the ￿rst three moments of these distributions and, in addition to con-
￿rming the observations made in the last paragraph also shows a further feature, that
the mean of the distribution is lower than at the MCEE even for low values of the gain
for which the projection algorithm is not used.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
11It might be thought that the likelihood of the projection algorithm being used would depend on
the volatility of the driving process for technology. However this is not the case since the weighting
matrix R in (20) corrects for this. At the MCEE, R is simply the variance covariance matrix of capital
and technology, so when the technology shock has small standard deviation the inverse of the weighting
matrix is large.
12This argument applies to the autoregressive parameters ￿kk and ￿aa. It is a priori unclear what
e⁄ect projection will have on the cross terms ￿ka and ￿ak or on the elements of ’.
18Understanding the e⁄ects of these stationary distributions in the model economy is
complex, so ￿rst consider a simple example.
5.3 A simple example
To understand the e⁄ect of a stationary distribution of beliefs on the macroeconomy, it
is helpful to consider a simple univariate example13 in which capital and labour are ￿xed
and income follow an exogenous AR(1) process:
yt = ￿yt￿1 + "t (48)
Beliefs are parametrized by a scalar ￿ such that
~ Etyt+i = ￿
iyt (49)





(1 + r)bt +
1




where bt is current wealth and the second term represents expectations about future in-
come. Note the ￿rst and second derivatives to ￿ of the second term are positive capturing
the positive and increasing e⁄ect of income persistence on consumption. Although only
the in￿nite forecast horizon case will be considered here, the second derivative of f is
positive as long as T > 0.
When beliefs are model-consistent, i.e. ￿t = ￿ 8t consumption will be a random walk







1 ￿ ￿(1 + r)
￿1￿" (51)
Beliefs are updated by a simpli￿ed constant gain learning algorithm
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿ (yt ￿ ￿tyt￿1) (52)
How does the stationary distribution of ￿ a⁄ect the economy? Firstly, assume that
the distribution has a mean of ￿ (the value of beliefs at the MCEE); non-zero standard
deviation and is symmetric. To understand the impact of this distribution on the un-
conditional properties of consumption consider the response of consumption to a positive
innovation to income. Taking ￿ = 0:9, ￿gure 6 shows the response in the three cases of
￿0 = ￿
￿ = ￿; ￿0 = 0:95 > ￿ and ￿0 = 0:85 < ￿.
13Full details are in Appendix D.
19[FIGURE 6 HERE]
5.3.1 Case 1: ￿ = ￿
If households￿beliefs are correct, then the impact response of consumption will be exactly
that at the MCEE. In the second period, beliefs will be revised upwards. This will mean
consumption in period 2 is higher than it would be in at MCEE since households believe
income will be more persistent than it actually is. In the third period, there are two
e⁄ects. Firstly, beliefs will be revised downward towards the MCEE. Secondly, household
wealth will be lower than expected. Both of these tend to reduce consumption. As time
passes, these two e⁄ects continue, and at some point consumption will fall below its
value at the MCEE and remain there for the rest of history (as is required to satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint).
To summarise, learning has no impact e⁄ect but causes consumption to rise above
its value at the MCEE for a number of periods after the initial one, then fall below this
value for the rest of time.
Proposition 1. If beliefs are initialized at the MCEE, the impulse response function with
learning implies a higher volatility of consumption growth than without learning
Proof. See Appendix D.1
5.3.2 Case 2: ￿ > ￿
In this case households believe that income is more persistent that it is at the MCEE so
on impact increase their consumption by more than with correct beliefs. In subsequent
periods there are two e⁄ects. Firstly, households wealth will be lower than expected
which will tend to reduce consumption. Secondly, beliefs will be revised, in the second
period upward and in subsequent periods downward back towards the MCEE. In the
second period the second e⁄ect dominates so consumption increases further, in subsequent
periods both e⁄ects go in the same direction and as time passes, consumption will fall
below its value at the MCEE and stay there for the rest of time. So the overall e⁄ect is
higher consumption than at the MCEE for some initial periods, then consumption lower
than at the MCEE for the rest of time.
5.3.3 Case 3: ￿ < ￿
The intuition for this case is simply the mirror image of that with ￿ > ￿. However
note the di⁄erence in magnitude. Since the derivative of the consumption function is
increasing in ￿, the response is much smaller to a lower value of ￿ than to the higher one
of the previous section.
20Given these three cases, the unconditional properties of consumption will be the aver-
age of the three cases weighted by the stationary distribution of ￿. Since the distribution
is assumed to be symmetric, the larger impact of case 2 will dominate the smaller one of
case 3 and the volatility of consumption will increase.
So the distribution of beliefs will unambiguously increase the volatility of consump-
tion. The higher the gain, the higher will be the standard deviation of beliefs so the
higher will be the standard deviation of consumption. This is the simple intuition that
"learning increases aggregate volatility" though note that the volatility it increases is that
of consumption. As we shall see below, in general labour supply and investment e⁄ects
of this mean a reduction in the volatility of output.
There is a further e⁄ect. The theorem of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) that states
the mean of the distribution will be at the MCEE only holds for small values of the gain.
In practice, the mean will often be di⁄erent from the MCEE. Since the distribution of
beliefs causes the mean response of consumption to be di⁄erent from that at the MCEE,
the response of capital will also be di⁄erent (if consumption responds by more capital
would be expected to be less persistent) and hence the mean ALM will be di⁄erent from
the MCEE. So the mean of the distribution will be di⁄erent from the MCEE, in this
case lower.
How do the properties of consumption change if the mean of the distribution is lower
than at the MCEE (either for the reason given in the previous paragraph or due to the
projection facility, as will be discussed in the next section)? If the mean is lower, draws
of ￿ from case 3 are more likely than those from case 2, and if the it is su¢ ciently low
this will result in the standard deviation of consumption falling below its value at the
MCEE. Similarly, if the distribution is su¢ ciently skewed to the left this will result in
the standard deviation of consumption falling.
To summarise, this simple example suggests that the stationary distribution of beliefs
will have the following e⁄ects:
1. If it is symmetrical, the non-linearity of consumption to beliefs will mean consump-
tion responds by more on impact and be more volatile. This will imply the mean
of the distribution is slightly lower than at the MCEE.
2. If the mean of the distribution is lower, this will o⁄set the e⁄ects in (1) and make
consumption respond by less on impact and be less volatile
3. If the distribution is skewed to the left, this will further o⁄set the e⁄ects.
5.4 Inspecting the mechanism
Returning to the model presented in section 2, the statistic used to study the e⁄ects of
learning will be the ratio of the standard deviation of a variable in the model with learning
21to the standard deviation in the model under model-consistent expectations. Table 2
shows how this statistic varies with the learning gain. First note the key features: learning
increases the standard deviation of consumption, labour and investment but reduces that
of output. Overall the e⁄ects are small, at most a few percent. The impact on output
is in contrast to the conventional intuition which says learning increases volatility.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The ￿nal column of the table shows that percentage of periods in which the projection
facility was used is increasing in the gain. This is because increasing gain implies in-
creasing volatility of beliefs so a higher likelihood that beliefs will correspond to "rational
bubble" or explosive paths for which the projection facility is invoked.
To understand these statistics, and the impact of learning it is useful to look at the
impulse response functions to a positive innovation to the process for technology in ￿gure
714. These show the di⁄erence between the impulse response under learning and the
impulse response at the MCEE. As with all RBC-type models, the dynamics of all the
variables are driven by the response of consumption so start by focussing on this variable.
[FIGURE 7 HERE]
First take the case of a very low gain ￿ = 0:001. This eliminates the e⁄ect of
projection (see the ￿nal column of table 1) so the mean of the distribution is very close
to the MCEE (it will be slightly di⁄erent due to the e⁄ect discussed in the previous
section). Then, as discussed in the previous section, because of the non-linearity of the
consumption function to beliefs the impact response of consumption will be higher than
at MCEE. This means labour supply responds by less than at the MCEE (see 30) so
output and investment also respond by less on impact.
In subsequent periods the intuition is similar to that given in the previous section.
Beliefs are updated and then adjust back to their value at the MCEE which tends to
lead to higher consumption than at the MCEE. Secondly, household wealth falls below
its value at the MCEE due to lower investment and this tends to reduce consumption.
As time passes, the ￿rst e⁄ect becomes weaker and the second e⁄ect comes to dominate:
consumption remains above its value at the MCEE for the ￿rst ten or so periods; then
the e⁄ect of lower wealth causes it to fall below the MCEE value. Investment and labour
supply remain below their value at the MCEE for ￿fteen or so periods; output is always
below its value at the MCEE, explaining its lower standard deviation.
14Calculating impulse responses is complicated in a model with learning for two reasons. Firstly, the
size of the forecast error resulting from a shock (and hence the extent to which beliefs are updated and
the form of the IRF) will depend on the current state of the economy i.e. on Xt￿1 in the perceived law
of motion (20). Secondly, the e⁄ect of beliefs on the subsequent evolution of the economy is non-linear
so the economy can not be understood as sum of the IRFs in each period as is the case when everything
is linear. Impulse responses are therefore obtained by simulating a large amount of data and estimating
the impulse response function as a high order MA.
22Now consider the case of a higher gain ￿ = 0:02. Now the projection algorithm
will come into play (see the ￿nal column of table 2) and, as discussed in section 5.1, this
implies that mean beliefs correspond to less persistent expectations than at the MCEE.
So on impact consumption responds by less than at the MCEE. In the next period beliefs
are updated, but note the much larger e⁄ects of the updating due to the higher gain. In
subsequent periods, the intuition is the same as with a lower gain with the stronger e⁄ect
on labour supply and investment meaning output is further below its value at the MCEE.
5.5 Forecast horizon and dynamics
Table 3 shows the impact of varying the forecast horizon, holding the gain constant at
0:01. The table again shows the standard deviations of the variables relative to the
MCEE. The volatility of consumption is increasing in the forecast horizon, whereas the
volatility of output, labour and investment is falling. Note that for low values of the
forecast horizon we recover the simple intuition that learning unambiguously increases
volatility, but the e⁄ects are still small.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
To help understand these results, ￿gure 8 shows the di⁄erence between the impact
response of consumption for T = 1 and T = 1. The response with a forecast horizon
of 1 di⁄ers in two important respects: ￿rstly, the impact e⁄ect is larger; secondly the
"kink" in the second period caused by learning is much smaller, so much so that con-
sumption remains below its value at the MCEE for the ￿rst 10 periods. These are both a
consequence of the observation made in section 4.1 that the shorter the forecast horizon,
the less sensitive is consumption to beliefs. The two e⁄ects arise because with T = 1
consumption is less a⁄ected by mean beliefs being lower (so the impact e⁄ect is larger);
and less a⁄ected buy the updating of beliefs in period 2 (so the kink is smaller).
[FIGURE 8 HERE]
In the case of T = 1, the fact that investment is higher than its value at the MCEE
means the capital stock is higher and so output is higher than at the MCEE in all
periods i.e. the response of output is unambiguously ampli￿ed and the simple intuition,
that learning increases volatility is recovered. Note this only happens in the special case
of a low forecast horizon.
5.6 The impact of projection
The results in the previous sections assumed the projection facility is implemented to
prevent households learning non-stationary "rational bubble" paths for the states. This
23is a key part of the mechanism by which learning a⁄ects the dynamics of the economy.
Table 4 shows the relative standard deviations if this assumption is relaxed, and instead





stationary "rational bubble" paths can be learned, but explosive paths are excluded.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The ￿rst two rows are the same as those of table 2 since for small values of the gain
projection is not used. Larger values of the gain can result in explosive paths for the
endogenous variables (recall that both Williams, 2003 and Eusepi and Preston, 2011 write
that they discard such explosive solutions) and the ￿nal column of the table shows how
often such explosive paths occur. This issue arises because as the eigenvalues of the PLM
approach ￿
￿1, consumption asymptotes to in￿nity. In a su¢ ciently long sample of a
model with a su¢ ciently high gain, PLMs with such eigenvalues will be learnt resulting
in a response of consumption which is arbitrarily large.
This emphasizes the importance of always simulating learning models for very large
samples. In a short sample, particularly if the gain is in the middle of the range used
in this paper, it is possible that PLMs with eigenvalues close to ￿
￿1 will not be drawn,
so the economy appears to be stable. A potential way of dealing with this is to choose





allows any level of consumption volatility to be generated, and there seems to be no way
to support a particular choice.
5.7 Other sensitivities
Table 5 shows how the relative standard deviation varies with ￿, the intertemporal elastic-
ity of labour supply. As ￿ increases labour supply becomes less elastic and the volatility
of consumption increases. Recall that, other things equal, labour supply varies inversely
with consumption and hence if consumption increases, labour supply falls which reduces
current period output causing investment to fall and thus reducing output and consump-
tion in the next period. The less elastic is labour supply, the weaker is this e⁄ect so the
volatility of consumption rises with rising ￿. The more volatile is consumption the less
volatile will be investment and hence the capital stock, so the volatility of output will
also fall.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
Table 6 shows the e⁄ect of ￿, the persistence of the technology process. As ￿ falls the
volatility of both consumption and output rises. The reason for this is straightforward.
The lower is ￿, the less likely it is that the projection facility will be used, so the closer
is the mean of the distribution of the PLM to its value at the MCEE. This mutes the
24e⁄ect described in section 5.4 so increasing the volatility of the variables relative to the
MCEE.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
5.8 An intercept in the learning rule
The previous sections assumed the learning rules were speci￿ed in terms of the variables
in the MSV representation of the economy with model-consistent expectations. Many
other speci￿cations are possible, for example including other aggregates on the right hand
side of (20) such as consumption or returns; or including more lags. Such changes to the
learning rule will change the e⁄ects of learning on the economy, but it is not clear how
any particular learning rule can be justi￿ed.
A number of recent papers (Milani, 2011, Eusepi and Preston, 2011) include an in-
tercept in the learning rule, interpreted as capturing households￿uncertainty about the
steady state. It is straightforward to augment the model of this paper with an intercept




: Table 7 shows the
e⁄ect of this change on relative standard deviations. Comparing this table with table 2
shows that including an intercept strengthens the e⁄ect of learning. For example, con-
sidering a gain of 0.01, with the intercept consumption is 4% more volatile than at the
MCEE compared to 2% without the intercept; and output is 4% less volatile, compared
to 2% without the intercept. The ￿nal table of the column shows the percentage of runs
that are unstable (in which consumption exceeds machine limits). For a gain of 0.02,
around 10% of runs are unstable, for a gain of 0.05 all runs are unstable.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
Why should uncertainty about the intercept translate into high volatility and insta-
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where the second term picks up the e⁄ect of the intercept, a discounted forward sum of
a constant. For the discount factor of the baseline calibration, 1
1￿(1+r)￿1 ￿ 100 which, if
the persistence of income is 0:9 is around 10 times higher than the coe¢ cient on income.
Take a case where the household has estimated a positive value of ￿1. This means
consumption will be high and labour supply low and so the wage will be higher than the
household expected. This will mean in the next period ￿1 is higher, and so on until
the economy explodes. With small values of the gain, deviations in ￿1 are small so this
25mechanism is dominated by the shocks. With larger gain, the economy becomes unstable.
Note that the instability only if households are very forward looking - in models that
take the "Euler equation learning" approach (for example Milani, 2011, which uses an
intercept) it is not an issue since the ampli￿cation of the e⁄ect of learning a non-zero
intercept is much smaller.
6 Discussion
This paper described a baseline case which allows the impact of the assumption of model-
consistent expectations to be studied in isolation. If households are individually rational,
the assumption of model-consistent expectations does not seem important in the sense
that if households are endowed with simple learning rules, the economy with learning
is very similar to that with model-consistent expectations. The response of output
is actually muted under learning, which shows that the simple intuition that learning
increases volatility does not hold in this benchmark model. The mechanism by which
learning a⁄ects the economy is in fact quite complex.
The degree of individual rationality, captured by parametrizing households￿forecast
horizons, has signi￿cant e⁄ects on the properties of the model, in particular it is the
key parameter which a⁄ects the speed of convergence. Also only in the case of very
short forecast horizons (similar to "Euler equation learning") can learning increase the
volatility of all variables, in keeping with simple intuition.
One way of reading the results of this paper is as support for the assumption of
model-consistent expectations. However there are a number of implicit assumptions in
the paper which mean that this reading should be taken with a pinch of salt.
The ￿rst is that if households are endowed with su¢ cient cognitive ability estimate
VARs and solve in￿nite horizon problems, it seems strange to assume that they do not
realize they are identical and that solving their consumption problem is the same as
solving the aggregate economy. However a previous version of this paper studied a model
with heterogeneity among households (created by a household speci￿c productivity shock)
and while this greatly complicated the model it did not have any dramatic e⁄ect on the
results (though it did mitigate the instability problem with an intercept). So perhaps
the assumption that households do not know they are identical is not as important as it
might initially seem.
The second is that the results are derived under the assumption of full information.
A large literature (see Hellwig, 2006 for a review) argues that this is a very strong as-
sumption and Graham and Wright (2010) solve a model similar to this paper under
incomplete information and model-consistent expectations and ￿nd that imperfect infor-
mation has a dramatic e⁄ect on the properties of the model. Graham (2011) extends
this to a model with learning but ￿nds that while information matters, the assumption
26of model-consistent expectations is not important.
Thirdly, the assumption of linearity means that the household￿ s problem is a relatively
simple one. Embedding learning rules into a non-linear model (of the style of Krusell
and Smith, 1997) seems an interesting avenue for future research.
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28Figure 1A:Convergence under OLS learning with T = 1 over 1,000 periods
￿kk ￿ka






















































































































x-axis is time; y-axis is the deviation of the element of the PLM from its value at the MCEE,
95% of responses lie within the shaded areas. Graphs taken from 25,000 repetitions.
29Figure 1B:Convergence under OLS learning with T =1 over 100 periods
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x-axis is time; y-axis is the deviation of the element of the PLM from its value at the MCEE,
95% of responses lie within the shaded areas. Graphs taken from 25,000 repetitions.
30Figure 2A:Convergence under OLS learning with T = 1 , impulse responses
t = 20 t = 50












































































t = 50 t = 500












































































t = 700 t = 1000












































































x-axis shows number of from impulse; y-axis the deviation of the consumption from its steady
state. The solid line is the impulse response at the MCEE, the dotted line the mean response
under learning. 99% of the responses under learning lie within the shaded areas. Graphs taken
from 25,000 repetitions.
31Figure 2B:Convergence under OLS learning with T = 1 , impulse responses
t = 10 t = 20















































































t = 50 t = 100















































































t = 200 t = 500

















































































x-axis shows number of from impulse; y-axis the deviation of the consumption from its steady
state. The solid line is the impulse response at the MCEE, the dotted line the mean response
under learning. 99% of the responses under learning lie within the shaded areas. Graphs taken
from 25,000 repetitions.
32Figure 3: The largest eigenvalue for di⁄erent forecast horizons



























33Figure 4A:Convergence of ￿kk under constant gain learning with T = 1 over
1,000 periods for di⁄erent values of the gain
￿ = 0:001 ￿ = 0:002


























































￿ = 0:01 ￿ = 0:02


























































x-axis is time; y-axis is the deviation of the element of the PLM from its value at the MCEE,
95% of responses lie within the shaded areas. Graphs taken from 25,000 repetitions.
34Figure 4B:Convergence of ￿kk under constant gain learning with T =1 over
100 periods for di⁄erent values of the gain
￿ = 0:001 ￿ = 0:002


























































￿ = 0:01 ￿ = 0:02


























































x-axis is time; y-axis is the deviation of the element of the PLM from its value at the MCEE,
95% of responses lie within the shaded areas. Graphs taken from 25,000 repetitions.
35Figure 5: The stationary distribution of ￿
(best viewed in colour; if viewed in monochrome, note that as the gain rises, the mean
of the distributions fall)
￿kk ￿ka































































36Figure 6: A simple example: impulse responses of consumption with
di⁄erent beliefs
















37Figure 7: Changing gain: di⁄erence between impulse responses with
learning and those at the MCEE
consumption output
















































38Figure 8: Changing forecast horizon: di⁄erence between impulse responses
with learning and those at the MCEE
consumption output




















































kk = 0:964) ￿ka (￿
￿
ka = 0:058)
Gain Mean SD Skewness
0:0001 0:964 0:000 0:000
0:001 0:963 0:001 0:000
0:002 0:963 0:002 0:007
0:005 0:962 0:003 0:026
0:01 0:962 0:005 0:093
0:02 0:962 0:005 0:317
Gain Mean SD Skewness
0:0001 0:059 0:000 0:000
0:001 0:059 0:001 0:000
0:002 0:059 0:001 ￿0:157
0:005 0:059 0:002 ￿0:735
0:01 0:058 0:003 ￿1:049
0:02 0:058 0:004 ￿0:944
￿ak (￿
￿
ak = 0:000) ￿aa (￿
￿
aa = 0:9000)
Gain Mean SD Skewness
0:0001 0:000 0:004 0:000
0:001 ￿0:001 0:014 0:000
0:002 ￿0:002 0:020 ￿0:012
0:005 ￿0:004 0:033 ￿0:077
0:01 ￿0:007 0:050 ￿0:106
0:02 ￿0:014 0:077 ￿0:159
Gain Mean SD Skewness
0:0001 0:900 0:004 0:000
0:001 0:899 0:011 ￿0:210
0:002 0:898 0:016 ￿0:283
0:005 0:897 0:025 ￿0:351
0:01 0:893 0:035 ￿0:432
0:02 0:886 0:054 ￿0:558
40Table 2: Changing gain: ratio of moments of key variables in the economy
with learning to their value at the MCEE
Gain c y n x Proj
0:001 1:002 0:999 1:003 1:001 0:00%
0:002 1:003 0:997 1:004 1:000 0:00%
0:005 1:008 0:993 1:005 0:997 0:00%
0:01 1:017 0:984 1:007 0:993 0:14%
0:02 1:030 0:977 1:019 0:990 1:05%
0:05 1:085 0:975 1:029 0:989 4:12%
Table 3: Changing forecast horizon: ratio of moments of consumption in the
economy with learning to their value at the MCEE
T c y n x Proj
1 1:001 1:002 1:009 1:006 0:33%
2 1:001 1:001 1:007 1:005 0:33%
5 1:001 0:999 1:002 1:000 0:31%
10 1:002 0:996 0:997 0:996 0:29%
50 1:007 0:990 0:998 0:995 0:21%
1 1:017 0:984 1:007 0:993 0:14%
Table 4: Changing gain with rational bubble paths: ratio of moments of key
variables in the economy with learning to their value at the MCEE
Gain c y n x Errors
0:001 1:002 0:999 1:003 1:001 0%
0:002 1:003 0:997 1:004 1:000 0%
0:005 1:011 0:990 1:011 1:000 0%
0:01 1:078 0:983 1:120 1:045 9%
0:02 2:023 1:031 2:685 1:985 31%
0:05 n=a n=a n=a n=a 100%
41Table 4: Changing elasticity of labour supply, ￿ : ratio of moments of key
variables in the economy with learning to their value at the MCEE
￿ c y n x
0 1:000 0:981 1:024 1:005
1 1:006 0:981 1:016 0:997
2 1:010 0:982 1:012 0:994
5 1:017 0:984 1:007 0:993
10 1:021 0:986 1:005 0:990
1 1:028 0:991 1:003 0:989
Table 5: Changing persistence of technology, ￿ : ratio of moments of key
variables in the economy with learning to their value at the MCEE
￿ c y n x Proj
0:5 1:024 0:998 1:005 1:002 0:03%
0:6 1:024 0:996 1:004 1:000 0:04%
0:7 1:023 0:994 1:003 0:998 0:05%
0:8 1:022 0:992 1:003 0:996 0:06%
0:9 1:017 0:984 1:007 0:993 0:14%
0:95 1:010 0:977 1:034 0:991 0:37%
Table 6: Changing gain with intercept in learning rule: ratio of moments of
key variables in the economy with learning to their value at the MCEE
Gain c y n x Errors
0:001 1:009 0:995 1:009 1:000 0%
0:002 1:019 0:983 1:021 0:998 0%
0:005 1:025 0:974 1:028 0:995 0%
0:01 1:041 0:960 1:031 0:986 4%
0:02 1:063 0:942 1:046 0:979 9%
0:05 n=a n=a n=a n=a 100%
42A Linearisation
A.1 The steady state


















r ￿ 1 + ￿
(A.4)
Then from the capital evolution equation (3)
I = ￿K (A.5)























R ￿ 1 + ￿
R
(A.9)
FOC for labour (5):
n
s































43and the capital evolution equation (3)
k
s





The ￿rm FOCs (7)
wt = yt ￿ nt (A.14)
rt = yt ￿ kt (A.15)
The production function (6)
yt = ￿at + ￿nt + (1 ￿ ￿)kt (A.16)











A.3 Market clearing prices
For the next two sections, the derivation is from the modeler￿ s perspective i.e. with the
knowledge that in equilibrium all households are identical.
To get an expression for the wage, use (A.10) and (A.14) to write
wt =
￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)kt + (1 ￿ ￿)&ct




t = ￿at ￿ ￿kt + ￿nt (A.19)
= (￿at ￿ ￿kt + ￿￿(￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ ct)) (A.20)
Then using (A.8)
rt = ￿[(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)kt + (1 + ￿￿)at ￿ ￿ct] (A.21)
Write these as
wt = ￿wkkt + ￿waat + ￿wcct (A.22)
rt = ￿rkkt + ￿raat + ￿rcct (A.23)
44where
￿wk = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) (A.24)
￿wa = ￿￿ (A.25)
￿wc = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)& (A.26)
￿rk = ￿3 (￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1) (A.27)
￿ra = ￿3 (1 + ￿￿) (A.28)
￿rc = ￿￿3￿ (A.29)




￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)kt + (1 ￿ ￿)&ct








￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ ct
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)&
￿
(A.31)
A.4 A useful representation
This follows Campbell (1994) to write the capital evolution in terms of states and con-
sumption. Combining (A.13) and (A.17) gives:











= ~ ￿1kt + ~ ￿2 [at + nt] + ~ ￿4ct (A.33)
where
~ ￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿) +
y
k












Then substituting (A.16) into (A.15) gives
r
k
t = ￿at ￿ ￿kt + ￿nt (A.37)
and using (A.8)
rt = ￿(at ￿ kt + nt)
45Next substitute in (A.10) to get
kt+1 = ~ ￿1kt + ~ ￿2 [at + nt] + ~ ￿4ct (A.38)
= ~ ￿1kt + ~ ￿2 [at + & (wt ￿ ct)] + ~ ￿4ct (A.39)









￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)&ct + (1 ￿ ￿)kt






= ￿1kt + ￿2at + ￿4ct (A.41)
where
￿1 = ~ ￿1 + ~ ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (A.42)
￿2 = ~ ￿2 (1 + ￿￿) (A.43)
￿4 = ~ ￿4 + ~ ￿2& [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿] = ￿4 + ~ ￿2￿ = 1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 (A.44)
￿ =
&
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)&
(A.45)
B Optimal consumption given prices





















t)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(rkt + k
s
t) (B.1)

















t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)rt] (B.2)
where
￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
k
y















































































































































t+i = ￿rt+1 + ￿
2 (rt+1 + rt+2) + ￿
3 (rt+1 + rt+2 + rt+3) + :::
= ￿(rt+1 + ￿rt+2 + ::: + ::￿
Trt+T:) + ￿
2 ￿
rt+1 + ￿rt+2 + :::￿
T￿2rt+T￿1
￿









































































































































































































































































































































































= ￿ck (￿1kt + ￿3wt + ￿5rt) + ￿cXXt (C.10)
where






















(￿1kt + ￿3wt + ￿5rt) + ￿cXXt (C.11)
￿cX = (￿cwTw + ￿crTr)’t￿￿(I ￿ ￿￿)
￿1 (C.12)
49￿cw =












￿2 (1 + ￿)
(￿1kt + ￿3wt + ￿5rt) + ￿cXXt (C.15)































C.2 Comparison with Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007)
Rearranging (A.41) gives
￿4ct = kt+1 ￿ ￿1kt ￿ ￿2at (C.21)
￿4Etct+1 = Etkt+2 ￿ ￿1Etkt+1 ￿ ￿2Etat+1 (C.22)
and using (A.23)
Etrt+1 = ￿rkEtkt+1 + ￿raEtat+1 + ￿rcEtct+1 (C.23)
Substituting these into the Euler equation (A.7) gives








1 + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿rc) + ￿4￿rk
(C.26)
￿3 =
￿2 (1 ￿ ￿rc) + ￿4￿ra




1 + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿rc) + ￿4￿rk
(C.28)
(this is equivalent to equation (20) in Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007).
If the PLM is
kt = ￿kkkt￿1 + ￿kaat￿1 (C.29)









Etkt+1 = ￿kktkt + ￿katat (C.32)
Etkt+2 = ￿kktEtkt+1 + ￿katEtat+1 (C.33)







kt + (￿kk￿ka + ￿ka￿aa)at (C.35)







kt + (￿kk￿ka + ￿ka￿aa)at
￿









+ ￿2 + ￿3￿ak
￿





















+ ￿1 + ￿3￿ak ￿ ￿kk ￿4￿ka (￿kk + ￿aa) + ￿3￿aa + ￿2 ￿ ￿ka




6 6 6 6
4
2￿4￿kk ￿ 1 ￿4￿ak ￿4￿ka + ￿3 0
￿4￿ka ￿4 (￿kk + ￿aa) ￿ 1 0 ￿4￿ka + ￿3
0 0 ￿1 0
0 0 0 ￿1
3
7 7 7 7
5
(C.37)
￿4￿kt + ￿￿4 ￿ 1 (C.38)
2￿4￿kt ￿ 1 (C.39)
While it would take many pages of algebra to prove that the consumption function
implies by (C.24) is equivalent to (27), it is easy to check numerically that the eigenvalues
(and indeed the coe¢ cients in (C.24)) are identical to those for the model of this paper.
C.3 Market clearing
The modeler, using the knowledge that in equilibrium all households are identical, can
sum (C.10) over households to give an expression for aggregate consumption
ct = ￿ck (￿1kt + ￿3wt + ￿5rt) + ￿cXXt (C.40)
Substituting for market clearing prices from (A.22) and (A.23) gives
ct = ￿ck (￿1kt + ￿3 (￿wkkt + ￿waat + ￿wcct) + ￿5 (￿rkkt + ￿raat + ￿rcct)) + ￿cXXt (C.41)
or




1 ￿ ￿ck (￿3￿wc + ￿5￿rc)
[￿ck (￿1 + ￿3￿wk + ￿5￿rk)Tk + ￿ck (￿3￿wa + ￿5￿ra)Ta + ￿cX]
C.4 The actual law of motion



































subject to a budget constraint
bt+1 = (1 + r)bt + yt ￿ ct (D.2)
where yt is an exogenous process
yt = ￿yt￿1 + "t (D.3)
and the innovation is drawn from N (0;￿).
Let the household have belief ￿t about the persistence of the income process, so
~ Etyt+i = ￿
i
t yt (D.4)
Note in the case of model-consistent expectations ￿t = ￿
The ￿rst-order condition for consumption is
ct = Etct+1 (D.5)
and, using the transversality condition lim
t!1
1





(1 + r)bt +
1




Let beliefs be updated according to a simple constant gain algorithm
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿ (yt ￿ ￿tyt￿1) (D.7)
























53D.1 Proof of proposition 1
Starting from ￿0 = ￿, in response to an innovation "0 beliefs in period 1 are ￿1 = ￿+￿"0
and then are revised back towards the MCEE i.e. ￿t > ￿ 8t > 2: Since f0 (￿) > 0 this
implies c > c￿ for a number of initial periods then c < c￿ for the rest of history. If
we de￿ne the impulse response of consumption as a function IRF then the standard







Since ￿0 = ￿ = ￿
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